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feat(sandbox): Landlock TCP port restriction for mandatory proxy#16

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feat(sandbox): Landlock TCP port restriction for mandatory proxy#16
Ladas wants to merge 2 commits into
mvp-v2from
feat/landlock-tcp-port

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@Ladas

@Ladas Ladas commented Jun 12, 2026

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Summary

Add Landlock ABI v4 TCP port restriction to Platform mode. Restricts
connect() to proxy port only (3128). All other ports return EACCES
at the kernel level. Makes the CONNECT proxy mandatory, not cooperative.

Depends on: #15 (Platform mode base)

1 file, +43/-3 lines. Compiles, tests pass, clippy clean.

Ref: NVIDIA#899

Assisted-By: Claude Code

@Ladas Ladas force-pushed the feat/platform-mode branch from 421a0a7 to 869b3f0 Compare June 12, 2026 16:25
@Ladas Ladas force-pushed the feat/landlock-tcp-port branch from 9ec5718 to 179d108 Compare June 12, 2026 16:26
Ladas added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 12, 2026
Add kernel-level network syscall interception using SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
for Platform mode. Provides mandatory, syscall-level enforcement without
any capabilities.

DnsPinnedAllowlist: resolve domains to IPs at sandbox creation, freeze
for session lifetime (DNS rebinding prevention).

BPF filter intercepts: connect, sendto, sendmsg, recvfrom, recvmsg,
bind. Validates AUDIT_ARCH to prevent x32/compat ABI bypass.

Linux syscall wrappers: notification fd ioctls, pidfd_open/pidfd_getfd
for on-behalf-of operations (TOCTOU-safe), read_process_memory with
read_exact (no short reads), sockaddr parser (correct endianness for
sa_family, port, flowinfo), verify_socket_fd (mitigates fd-swap race),
deny/allow_connect response helpers.

Code review fixes applied across all PRs:
- PR #15: gateway propagates network_enforcement to DriverSandboxSpec
- PR #15: driver uses typed enum comparison (not magic integer)
- PR #16: saturating_sub prevents underflow in Landlock skipped count
- PR #16: warn!() on TCP port restriction failure (was debug)
- PR #17: BPF arch check, recvfrom/recvmsg/bind interception,
  verify_socket_fd, read_exact, allow_connect rename, flowinfo
  endianness, safety comments on all unsafe blocks

8 tests. Compiles, 949 tests pass, clippy clean.

Ref: NVIDIA#899
@Ladas Ladas force-pushed the feat/platform-mode branch from 869b3f0 to ec5655e Compare June 16, 2026 12:43
@Ladas Ladas force-pushed the feat/landlock-tcp-port branch from 179d108 to 59d148a Compare June 16, 2026 14:06
@Ladas Ladas force-pushed the feat/platform-mode branch from ec5655e to 7158b3d Compare June 16, 2026 14:55
@Ladas Ladas force-pushed the feat/landlock-tcp-port branch 2 times, most recently from 8354d68 to 0846c55 Compare June 17, 2026 14:04
@Ladas Ladas force-pushed the feat/platform-mode branch from 7158b3d to b44b196 Compare June 17, 2026 15:05
@Ladas Ladas force-pushed the feat/landlock-tcp-port branch from 0846c55 to 15e0993 Compare June 17, 2026 15:13
@Ladas

Ladas commented Jun 19, 2026

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/ok

@Ladas

Ladas commented Jun 19, 2026

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/ok to test

@Ladas Ladas changed the base branch from feat/platform-mode to mvp-v2 June 23, 2026 13:12
@Ladas Ladas force-pushed the feat/landlock-tcp-port branch 5 times, most recently from 007190d to 9736a60 Compare June 25, 2026 05:37
Ladas added 2 commits June 25, 2026 11:23
Add NetworkMode::Platform for running the supervisor without elevated
capabilities on Kubernetes platforms enforcing the restricted Pod
Security Standard (including OpenShift restricted-v2 SCC).

Platform Mode keeps Landlock filesystem isolation, seccomp syscall
filtering, OPA policy evaluation, credential injection, and L7
inspection via a loopback CONNECT proxy. It replaces the network
namespace (which requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN + CAP_NET_ADMIN) with:

- Loopback proxy binding (127.0.0.1 instead of veth interface)
- K8s driver: zero capabilities, drop ALL, non-root UID
- seccomp: block SOCK_DGRAM (UDP) in Platform mode to match the
  nftables UDP reject in namespace mode -- the proxy resolves
  DNS on behalf of the agent, so UDP is not needed
- Landlock scope: restrict abstract Unix sockets and signals
  (ABI v5+, BestEffort degrades on older kernels)

Security parity with namespace mode:

| Attack                 | Namespace mode         | Platform mode            |
|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| TCP bypass proxy       | nftables REJECT        | Landlock port 3128 only  |
| UDP exfiltration       | nftables REJECT        | seccomp SOCK_DGRAM block |
| DNS tunneling          | no UDP accept rule     | no SOCK_DGRAM            |
| Abstract Unix sockets  | netns isolation        | Landlock scope           |
| Signals to supervisor  | N/A (same netns)       | Landlock scope           |
| Container escape       | Risk (CAP_SYS_ADMIN)   | Impossible (zero caps)   |

Remaining gap: Landlock NetPort allows port 3128 on any IP (not just
loopback). Mitigate with egress NetworkPolicy denying all sandbox pod
egress -- loopback traffic is unaffected by NetworkPolicy.

Proto: add NetworkEnforcementMode enum and field to SandboxPolicy
and DriverSandboxSpec. Default NAMESPACE (0) preserves existing
behavior; PLATFORM (1) activates the new mode.

Signed-off-by: Ladislav Smola <lsmola@redhat.com>
Add Landlock ABI v4 TCP connect restriction for Platform mode. When the
kernel supports ABI v4, only the proxy port (default 3128) is allowed
for outbound TCP connections. On older kernels, BestEffort compat level
silently degrades -- the rule has no effect but the proxy still works
cooperatively.

Signed-off-by: Ladislav Smola <lsmola@redhat.com>
@Ladas Ladas force-pushed the feat/landlock-tcp-port branch from 9736a60 to bba651a Compare June 25, 2026 09:23
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